Abstract. In this paper, we investigate channel coordination of project supply chain based on uncertainty theory. The project is conducted by one manufacturer, whose materials are provided by different suppliers. To complete the project before its deadline, the manufacturer needs to consider two elements -the on-site task duration and the material delivery lead time. Due to the lack of historical data, these two elements are assumed as uncertain variables. Through modeling and analyzing, the time-based contract is proved to achieve channel coordination if the manufacturer can decide the following two terms: the targeted material delivery date, and the fraction and the timing of the delayed payment. The manufacturer and his suppliers can have a win-win outcome by contract design. The impacts of variables' uncertainty degrees are discussed as well. Generally speaking, uncertainty degrees' increases bring more risks to the project's completion. However, it is proved that the manufacturer can still keep his profit by changing the bonus and penalty even if the on-site duration and material delivery lead time's uncertainty degrees increase.
Introduction
Project supply chain optimization and coordination, integrated by supply chain optimization and project management, has been applied into project implementation process, such as residential buildings, communication systems and transportation systems [4] . A typical project is usually managed by one manufacturer, who procures various materials from more than one supplier. The construction process contains lots of tasks that need to be carried out in series, and each task requires some key materials over a specific period. Consequently, any delay in one task can trigger a chain reaction to the project's completion and cause high financial expenses to the manufacturer. As a result, the manufacturer will make great efforts to avoid the delay of completion time to get his payment as soon as possi-ble. It is neccessary for him to make the project supply chain achieve channel coordination through coordinating his construction schedule with his suppliers' production schedules.
Most literature considers the impacts of indeterminate demand on profits in supply chain's coordination. However, Chen and Lee [6] found that time indeterminacy, rather than demand indeterminacy, plays a major role. There are two elements that determine a project's completion time. The first one is the on-site task duration, which represents the time of the manufacturer's construction and assembly process. On-site tasks tend to be influenced by changeable weather. In addition, the manufacturer may have trouble in estimating the accurate work rate when the firm hires new workers or undertakes projects in unfamiliar cities. The other critical element is the material production and delivery lead time, which is referred to the material delivery lead time. Both sharp increase of orders and a sudden shortage of raw materials can obstruct the accurate lead time estimation. In practice, because of the unexpected emergencies and lack of historical data, the frequency of a variable is hard to be obtained, which means probability theory is unable to describe its distribution. Consequently, belief degrees, given by experienced managers and experts, is introduced to capture this indeterminacy. Uncertainty theory, founded by Liu [23] , is an alternative approach to deal with circumstances where only belief degrees are available. In this paper, we use uncertainty theory to address these indeterminate factors.
Due to the indeterminacy of time, it is highly challenging for the manufacturer to negotiate the delivery schedule with the suppliers. A supplier would design his production and delivery schedule in accordance with his profit without concerning about the manufacturer. To tackle this problem, the time-based incentive contracts are introduced in construction industry, and 72% of the surveyed projects were completed before their deadlines while without time-based contracts only 20% projects were completed on time [30] . However, few people analyze the impact of timebased contracts on projects based on mathematical models. Furthermore, no research has studied this impact by uncertainty theory. This paper tries to fill this gap by applying uncertainty theory to analyze the influence of time-based contracts on channel coordination in project supply chains under time uncertainty.
This paper provides several useful managerial insights about project supply chains' channel coordination in uncertain environment: -The time-based contract can achieve channel coordination if the manufacturer decides the following two terms: the targeted material delivery date, and the fraction and timing of the delayed payment. -If the manufacturer can change the values of bonus and penalty, he can keep his profit (or get more profit). Even if the uncertainty degrees of the on-site duration and the material lead time increase. -By setting the times of payment, the manufacturer can transfer some of his risks to suppliers.
This paper bears some similarity to Chen and Lee [6] in the following aspects. They also discussed the coordination of project supply chains, and analyzed the impacts of so-called delivery-based contracts. Although related, this paper studies timebased contracts based on uncertainty theory, while their paper considers probability theory. Considering the unavailable historical data brought by the uniqueness of projects and other indeterminate factors, uncertainty theory is much more suitable. When analyzing the models, their paper uses normal distribution, while we introduce zigzag distribution, and study two elements' uncertainty degrees by numerical experiments. Furthermore, we find that the times of payment in the contract can be changed to make more profits for the manufacturer.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of related literature. In Section 3, we first establish a model in centralized supply chain and derive the first-best solution for the whole channel; this serves as a benchmark. This paper then illustrates the underlying approach to analyze the project contracts in a decentralized supply chain, including the fixed-payment contracts and time-based contracts.
In Section 4, we analyze the properties of the coordinating contract and the impacts of uncertainty degrees on the participants. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5. For enhancing the presentation, all proofs are given in Appendix.
Literature Review
In what follows, we review the related literature on channel coordination, project supply chain and uncertainty theory. It is challenging for supply chain members to achieve channel coordination. Cachon [3] found that supply chain members are primarily concerned with optimizing individual profits. This self-serving focus usually leads to poor performances. Meanwhile, the coordination could be achieved by designing suitable contracts such that each member's benefit becomes aligned with the entire supply chain's benefit [32] . Lewis and Bajari [22] elaborated on that contractors would adjust supply chain members' work rates only if they were stimulated to do so. In this condition, how to design contracts to motivate subcontractors is the primary concern for the contractor. Kwon et al. [21] established the notion of coordinated project contracts by applying the current concept of channel coordination to projects. They also analyzed time-based and cost-based project contracts with unobservable work rates. In this study, inspired by Chen and Lee [6] , if the supplier's optimal decision on when to start producing materials in the decentralized supply chain is same with the central planner's determination in the centralized supply chain, this project supply chain is seen as achieving channel coordination. Time-based contract, which rewards the supplier for delivering materials early or punishes it for delaying material delivery, has been applied in actual projects [2, 16, 19, 34] . However, little literature concentrates on how this time-based contract influences the coordination of supply chain. This paper sheds light on the impacts of time-based contracts on project supply chain by modeling and numerical experiment.
The item "project supply chain" is similar to oneof-a-kind supply chain, build-to-order supply chain [12] and so on. In a typical project supply chain, the word "project" is mainly referred to customized project, such as residential buildings, communication systems [1] and transportation systems. Such projects have the characteristics of high customisation and extended construction periods. The present projectsupply-chain-management literature can be divided into four categories: (1) conceptual research, which merely studies the definitions of project supply chain using case analysis [11, 13, 20] ; (2) activity management, including procurement management [10, 25, 35] , logistics management [9, 38] and dispatching management; (3) relationship management, like principal-agent relationship between a manufacturer and his suppliers [28, 29] , or coordination and incentive mechanism [27] ; (4) information management [26, 31] , involving the application of information technology and the study of information flow between supply chain members. This paper plans to maximize the manufacturer's profit considering the material delivery lead time and the on-site task duration's uncertainties. The main difference between this paper and the existing literature of project supply chain is that uncertain variables are introduced in the face of unpredictable factors.
It is worthwhile mentioning that uncertainty theory has been widely applied to several academic fields [7, 33, 39] , especially to supply chain management [8, 14, 15, 17, 18] . Chen et al. [5] examined the impacts of parameters' uncertainty degrees on the pricing and effort decisions. Some researchers have already applied uncertainty theory into project management [36, 40] . Yang et al. [37] applied uncertain variables when investigating the impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information on the structure of incentive contracts. Due to the indeterminacy of weather and the unpredictable work rate, there are not enough historical data for the manufacturer to describe the probability distributions of the two variables (the material delivery lead time and the on-site task duration). Considering the uniqueness of each project, this situation is common. An effective approach is relying on experienced experts and managers to estimate these variables' belief degrees and using uncertainty theory to tackle the problems in uncertain environment. Compared with the existing literature based on uncertainty theory, this paper fills the gap in designing time-based contracts between a manufacturer and his suppliers considering procurement and logistics works.
Compared with the current literature, the contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, we find the best design of procurement contracts which can help achieve channel coordination in uncertain environment. No previous literature studied this coordination problem under uncertain environment. Secondly, we study how the distributions of on-site task duration and the material delivery lead time affect the manufacturer's profit. We also investigate the strategies the manufacturer can take to maintain his profit when these two variables' uncertainty degrees increase.
Basic Model
For the sake of model simplicity, this paper considers a model of a project which contains two serial on-site tasks.
Assumptions and Notations
In order to obtain analytical solutions, the following assumptions are made in this section.
-In a decentralized supply chain, there are one manufacturer and different suppliers. In a centralized supply chain, the manufacturer provides materials by himself. -The manufacturer holds more power than suppliers in a decentralized supply chain. -The manufacturer and his suppliers are risk neutral and aim at maximizing their profits. -Each task of this project needs essential materials which are provided by one particular supplier. -Suppliers are not able to adjust their work rates.
That is, a supplier can only determine the start time of producing materials. -The project contains two tasks, which are supposed to be carried out in series. -When the manufacturer completes the project, he can receive a fixed payment P 0 from his client. He pays his suppliers the material prices W n , n = 1, 2. -The supplier's production cost is C n , which occurs at the start time of materials' production, t n .
Under these assumptions, the time when the manufacturer can receive his materials is decided by the supplier's start time of producing materials. However, the supplier will consider her profit and may not start production works at the time the manufacturer desires. Then the manufacturer needs to incentive his suppliers to choose the most suitable start time of materials' production by designing contracts.
The on-site task duration and the material production and delivery lead time are two critical kinds of times that are required to be discussed. Let R n be the on-site task duration with distribution function F n , and l n , be the material production and delivery lead time with distribution function G n , indexed by n = 1, 2. R n and l n are both uncertain variables. Assume that the manufacturer has an accurate understanding of the distribution function of each supplier's lead time. Thus, he can infer each supplier's best response and determine his reaction. The time when the manufacturer starts his work for task 1 is assumed to time 0. The completion time of task 2 is CT (t 2 ). For obtaining analytical solutions, the two uncertain variables are assumed nonnegative and mutually independent. Here we introduce cost of capital to indicate the impact of time. α is a discount rate, which is used to calculate the financial expenses of the manufacturer, and α n is the supplier's discount rate for task n. For measuring this value conveniently, we use linear discount of cash flows. Here some notations are shown in Table 1 .
Benchmark Model
The construction in a centralized supply chain is considered first to find out when the supplier starts to produce materials is best for the manufacturer. In a centralized supply chain, the manufacturer provides materials by himself. He designs the schedule of material production to make it match well with the schedule of project construction. The incentive disalignment does not arise because there are no conflicts of interests between the manufacturer and the material providers. Therefore, the manufacturer chooses the most suitable start time of materials' production to maximize his profit.
In practice, the manufacturer can make an order to his supplier as early as possible. Therefore, this paper assumes that the manufacturer can always receive his materials of task 1 before time 0. The production of materials required by task 2 is started at t 2 . If the manufacturer would like to initiate task 2, he not only needs to finish task 1, but also receive the materials required by task 2. Thus the start time of task 2 is max(R 1 , t 2 + l 2 ). For the two-tasks-in-series project, the completion time of the entire project can be formulated as
The manufacturer's optimization problem can be described as max
where C 2 denotes the material production cost of task 2 generated at t 2 , C 2 (1 − αt 2 ) is the discounted cost of the material production, and P 0 (1 − αE[CT (t 2 )]) is the discounted payment for the manufacturer. This benchmark model aims to maximize the profit of the manufacturer. How much cost can be saved is up to t 2 . When the manufacturer provides materials for himself, he can choose the optimal time to start the process of material production. Accordingly, this paper considers the optimal solution of this benchmark model, t * 2 , as the best option for both centralized and decentralized supply chains, That is to say, the manufacturer can get the most benefit when starting to produce materials of task 2 from t * 2 . Here uncertainty theory is used to tackle this problem and get the following conclusion.
Lemma 1.
In the centralized supply chain, the central planner's optimal decision, t * 2 , is given by
where
means that the materials of task 2 have arrived at the construction site before the completion of task 1. Hence, the start time of task 2 depends on when the manufacturer can accomplish task 1. V 1 < t 2 represents that the previous task has been completed, but the manufacturer needs to wait for the arrival of task 2's materials. In this model, t * the material production cost of task n. R n : the on-site task duration with distribution function F n , an uncertain variable. l n :
the material production and delivery lead time with distribution function G n , an uncertain variable. α:
the cost of capital of the manufacturer. α n :
the cost of capital of the supplier for task n.
construction's start time. Then the manufacturer can make an order of materials to his suppliers as early as possible. t * 2 is not only the optimal solution of the model in the centralized supply chain, but also the best time to start producing task 2's materials in the decentralized supply chain. In the following discussion, we discuss how to design the contracts in a decentralized supply chain to get the optimal solution, which should be equal to t * 2 .
Decentralized Supply Chain -Fixed-Price Contract
In a decentralized supply chain, suppliers provide materials, thus the manufacturer cannot decide the start time of materials' production. The supplier of task 2 is the decision maker of t 2 . Recall that, if the manufacturer and his suppliers all prefer to maximize their profits without concerning the other participants, the conflicts of interests may happen. Therefore, we need to analyze how to coordinate the decentralized project supply chain. Two kinds of contracts are widely used in practice to solve this coordination problem, namely fixed-price contracts and time-based contracts. We will examine fixedprice contracts first to see whether they can achieve channel coordination.
A fixed price contract has a total fixed price W 2 that the manufacturer pays to supplier 2. A portion of W 2 is paid at the beginning of the project. The rest will be paid when the manufacturer finishes the project. Let w 2 denote the amount of the delayed payment. Thus (W 2 − w 2 ) means no-delayed price. Assume that the supplier knows w 2 , then his optimization problem is expressed as
where J S (t 2 , w 2 ) is the profit of supplier 2. NCF 2 (t 2 , w 2 , α 2 ) denotes the net cash flow between the manufacturer and supplier 2. As we have discussed before, this cash flow includes two parts, the no-delayed payment and the balance. We can deduce the expression of NCF 2 (t 2 , w 2 , α 2 ) with the linear discounting at rate α 2 .
The manufacturer can deduce the supplier's best response,t 2 (w 2 ), and will optimize his profit with t 2 (w 2 ) at rate α as follows:
(3) Then we can induce the following proposition.
Proposition 1.
The fixed-price contract with a partial payment being delayed cannot achieve channel coordination.
In this situation, the supplier would not like to start the production of materials at t * 2 for not being motivated properly. In other words, the fixed-price contract cannot achieve channel coordination.
Decentralized Supply Chain -Time-Based Contract
We now turn to time-based contracts. This contract usually consists of three essential elements: -A particular targeted delivery schedule T 2 for supplier 2, which is made by the manufacturer. -A payment W 2 for supplier 2, including C 2 being paid at max(T 2 , t 2 + l 2 ) + R 2 and (W 2 − C 2 ) being paid at the beginning of the project. -An incentive/disincentive scheme b 2 /p 2 . When supplier 2 delivers his materials earlier than T 2 , he can receive a bonus b 2 per day from the manufacturer. Also, he will be fined p 2 per day for late delivery. 
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The cash flow of the manufacturer includes four parts from a supplier's perspective: deposit, which happens before the beginning of the project when the manufacturer makes an order; balance payment, occurring when the project is completed; bonus, for earlier material delivery; and penalty, for delayed delivery. The bonus (or penalty) is paid when the project is completed. However, compared with the values of material price and the manufacturer's payment, the bonus and penalty will be relatively small and we choose not to calculate the discounts. We now can induce the cash flow NCF 2 (t 2 , T 2 , α 2 ) as follows:
When supplier 2 knows T 2 , hel determines his optimal production time by solving the following formula:
Then the manufacturer can interfere this supplier's optimal choice and maximize his profit as follows:
The manufacturer chooses the optimal solution of formula (8) , T * 2 , as the targeted material delivery schedule for supplier 2. Then supplier 2 will induce his optimal start time using T * 2 . Under this condition, the supplier's optimal start timet 2 (T 2 ) is equal to t * 2 , which means channel coordination can be obtained. For attaining a solution with simple form, we assume that α = α 2 . In most situations, the discounted rates of capital cost for all participants in the same project supply chain are approximately equal. With the optimal material delivery schedule T * 2 , the marginal change in the expected net cash flow from the manufacturer to the supplier should be zero. Hence,
Now we can design a time-based contract and give the following conclusion.
Therom 1. A time-based contract can achieve channel coordination if the following two conditions are satisfied:
-The value of the targeted material delivery date T * 2 is as follows:
).
-C 2 is paid at (max(T * 2 , t * 2 + l 2 ) + R 2 ), and (W 2 − C 2 ) is paid at the beginning of the project.
Under the conditions in Theorem 1, the supplier's best response will bẽ
To make sense for this formula, we need to make sure that p 2 > 0 and 0 < b 2 + p 2 < α 2 C 2 . The penalty for delayed delivery is required, but the bonus for earlier delivery can be zero. This conclusion is beneficial for the manufacturer. If he occupies the leading position in contract negotiations, he can motivate his supplier just by setting a penalty without paying any cost. We will prove this choice in Section 4.2.
Except for calculating the profits under uncertain environment, the other difference between this contract with Chen and Lee's [6] delivery-based contract is the time when the manufacturer pays the balance. We find that the manufacturer can pay balances and bonuses/penalties until the whole project is completed. This would not influence the starting time of task 2's material production. Furthermore, this payment time can benefit the manufacturer a lot.
From all these discussions, we can derive that fixed-price contracts cannot achieve channel coordination, while a time-based contract is adopted. In this contract, the manufacturer designs a targeted material delivery for his supplier, giving penalty for delayed delivery and bonus for no-delay delivery. The payment for one supplier also includes two main parts -the deposit, given at the beginning of the project when the manufacturer makes orders, and the balance payment, given at the project's completion time. If the payment time and the fraction of delayed payment are both determined by the manufacturer, it is possible to get a win-win outcome and channel coordination.
Model Analysis
In this section, we discuss two topics concerning time-based contracts. Firstly, we examine how distributions of the two variables (the on-site task duration, and the material production and delivery lead time) affect the manufacturer's equilibrium profit, the suppliers' equilibrium profits and the total profit of whole project supply chain. Secondly, how do the parameters of the time-based contract affect project supply chain's profit and each participator's share?
Effects of the Two Variables' Distributions
Assume that on-site task duration follows zigzag distribution, meaning that R 1 ∼ Z(m 1 , n 1 , o 1 ) and R 2 ∼ Z(m 2 , n 2 , o 2 ). The distribution of the material production and delivery lead time is independent of the on-site task duration, and
The effects of the two uncertain variables can be discussed from two aspects: the parameters that determine the variables' distributions and the uncertainty degrees. For the sake of model simplicity, we assume the discounted rates of capital cost are equal (α = α 2 ) in this section. Zigzag distribution is a piecewise function, and we need to discuss it under different conditions. For example, the formula of E[max(V 1 , t 2 )] is now addressed as: To study the profit of the whole project supply chain, we need to build the profit model first. It is clear that the channel profit J SC can be calculated by adding up J M and J S . Hence we can draw it as follows:
(10)
Effects of Distributions' Parameters
As we have assumed before, It is intelligible that the reduction of the on-site task duration is positively related to the profits of the whole supply chain and the manufacturer -this reduction will help the manufacturer finish this project earlier and make the cost of capital decrease. According to the time-based contract, the formulation of J S and the profit of supplier 2 is related to t 2 and max(T 2 , t 2 + l 2 ), and the profit of supplier 2 is independent of R 1 . Therefore, the three parameters of R 1 do not affect the profit of supplier 2. 1 and n 1 for J * SC , J * S and J * M . When these three parameters increase, the profits of the manufacturer and the supplier will both decrease. The choice that the manufacturer pays the balance and bonus/penalty when the project is completed is a way to transfer his risks to this supplier. Meanwhile, R 2 has no influence on t * 2 . That is to say, it will not change the channel coordination, and the manufacturer can benefit from this risk-sharing if his supplier accepts this contract. Corollary 3 is also inferred by the first-order derivatives with respect to i 2 , j 2 and k 2 . The reduction of the material production and delivery lead time is prone to help the manufacturer to shorten construction period and supplier 2 obtain payment of material earlier. However, the first-order derivatives of J * M with respect to i 2 , j 2 and k 2 are sometimes greater than zero and sometimes less, which means the impact of these three parameters on the manufacturer's interest is not monotone.
Above all, Corollaries 1, 2 and 3 prove that the manufacturer can always benefit from the reduction of on-site task duration. In fact, the expected value of zigzag distribution can be expressed as follows, taking R 1 ∼ Z(m 1 , n 1 , o 1 ) as an example:
According to this formula, if one of the three parameters m 1 , n 1 and o 1 increases, the expected value will increase. However, the increase of the expected value cannot reflect a single parameter's variation trend. We cannot infer the outcome of Corollaries 1, 2 and 3, if we only know the change of the expected value. That is why we do not express the corollaries with it.
Effects of Uncertainty Degrees
In this subsection, we discuss the effects of uncertainty degrees of the on-site task duration and the material delivery lead time on profits and the time when the manufacturer makes orders. Uncertainty degree can be reflected by a variable's range. When the range increases, the uncertainty degree increases, and the estimation of a variable becomes more inaccurate.
To avoid the different expected values' influences, we make the central parameter of zigzag distribution remain invariant, and change the other parameters at the same time. The numerical experiment is applied to tackle this problem due to the complexity of the time-based model. For simplifying the calculation, we assume that b = p, which can be true in real world. Knowing that zigzag distribution is a piecewise function, its inverse function is divided by 0.5. According to Lemma 1, we need to make two streams of assumptions, which are divided by judging whether C 2 /P 0 > 0.5 or not. For enhancing the presentation, only two sets of number assumptions are revealed in Table 2 . The column in Value 1 belongs to C 2 /P 0 > 0.5, and the other represents C 2 /P 0 ≤ 0.5.
We assume that R 1 ∼ Z (20, 30, 50 ) and l 2 ∼ Z (10, 20, 35) . Also, by analyzing the formulas of J M and J S , we find that the value of R 2 does not influence the decision of supplier 2 about when to start producing materials. Therefore, we choose not to analyze the influence of R 2 . For eliminating the potential impacts of these assumptions, we design several dozens of experiments, and obtain the following two corollaries.
Corollary 4. When the uncertainty degree of the onsite task duration (R 1 ) increases,
-if C 2 /P 0 > 0.5, the manufacturer has to make a postponed targeted delivery schedule for his supplier, and the supplier can start his production later. -if C 2 /P 0 ≤ 0.5, the manufacturer has to make an advanced targeted delivery schedule for his supplier, and the supplier has to start his production earlier.
The difference between these two situations is actually due to the characteristic of a piecewise function, but it can also be explained in terms of economics. The increase of the on-site task duration's uncertainty degree means that the completion time of task 1 is harder to be estimated. In a centralized supply chain, when the cost of material production is relatively small, the producer can afford the extra cost of funds for material production, which is caused by earlier start of production, to make sure the project will not be postponed by lacking materials. In decentralized supply chain, as we aim to achieve coordination, the manufacturer will make an advanced targeted delivery schedule to make sure that his supplier starts producing materials earlier. Then the conclusion of C 2 /P 0 ≤ 0.5 can also be explained. The increase of the on-site task duration's uncertainty degree brings more risks to the completion of the project, causing the decrease of J * M and J * SC . Figure 1 shows the trend of J * M when the uncertainty degrees of R 1 and b(p) change.
Corollary 5. When the uncertainty degree of the material production and delivery lead time (l 2 ) increases,
-if C 2 /P 0 > 0.5, the manufacturer has to make a postponed targeted delivery schedule for his supplier, and the supplier can start his production later. -if C 2 /P 0 ≤ 0.5, the manufacturer has to make an advanced targeted delivery schedule for his supplier, and the supplier has to start his production earlier. -J * SC will decrease. The explanation of Corollary 5 is similar with Corollary 4. However, the trend of J * M is much more complicated. Figure 2 shows the trend of J * M when the uncertainty degree of l 2 and b 2 (p 2 ) change. It can be seen in this figure that the influence of the material delivery lead time on J * M is different when b 2 (p 2 ) changes.
Properties of Time-based Contract
Three parameters are critical for the time-based contract -the payment W 2 for supplier 2, the bonus b 2 for earlier delivery and the penalty p 2 for delayed delivery. The values of these three factors are determined by the negotiation between the manufacturer and the supplier. The influences of W 2 , p 2 and b 2 can be the guidance for the project supply chain members when signing contracts. In Corollary 6, we can conclude that these three parameters do not influence the profit of the whole supply chain, just influencing the appropriation of profits between the channel participators. It is clear that the increasing of W 2 will make the profit of the manufacturer decrease and the supplier of task 2 will obtain more benefit accordingly. When being charged for late delivery, supplier 2 may lose part of his profit, which is related to p 2 . Consequently, p 2 is negatively related to supplier 2's profit and positively related to the manufacturer's interest. The impacts of b 2 is opposite to p 2 . These three parameters cannot influence the profit of the whole project supply chain. They only have the power on changing the division of it between all participators.
We now discuss the trend of J * M when b 2 (p 2 ) changes. It can be seen in Figs. 1 and 2 that when b 2 (p 2 ) increases, J * M decreases firstly, then increases and decreases finally. The interval of b 2 (p 2 ) that J * M increases in Fig. 1 is overlapping partly with the growth interval in Fig. 2 . When the uncertainty degrees of R 1 and l 2 increase, the manufacturer can also obtain enough profit by changing the bonus and penalty.
To eliminate the influence of the assumption b 2 = p 2 , we also study how the manufacturer can obtain the largest profit by adjusting b 2 and p 2 respectively. Assumptions of other numbers are same with Section 4.1.2. The outcome is calculated by Matlab using Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) Algorithm. Then we find that if the manufacturer has enough power to decide the bonus and penalty, he does not give any bonus and only set penalty as large as possible. This choice can benefit the manufacturer. However, suppliers may not accept this kind of contracts.
This subsection suggests that the member who is able to adjust these factors can make the maximized profit for himself. This encourages these participants to improve their bargaining power when signing contracts. In this paper, we assume that the manufacturer has more power, which means he can have more benefits. Furthermore, through the negotiation of these parameters, both parties of the contract have chances to obtain a win-win outcome, which is meaningful and makes the time-based contract widely used in real projects.
Conclusions
In this paper, after taking time indeterminacy's influence into consideration, we coordinate the manufacturer's construction schedule with his suppliers' schedules and achieve channel coordination by designing a time-based contract.
The contributions of this paper can be concluded as follows. Most researchers study project supply chain based on demand indeterminacy. This paper considers time indeterminacy in uncertain environment. It is noteworthy that although time indeterminacy has a significant impact on project's profits, only few works so far have focused on studying project supply chain with time indeterminacy. Meanwhile, we introduce uncertainty theory and assume that the on-site task duration and the material production and delivery lead time are uncertain variables. The influences of uncertain variables' parameters and uncertainty degrees on the participants' profits are also discussed explicitly.
For the manufacturer, if he can make the targeted delivery schedule for suppliers and change the timing and fraction of delayed payment, which is the key part of a time-based contract, it is possible to achieve channel coordination and have a win-win outcome. The manufacturer and his suppliers can benefit from reducing the on-site task duration, the production and delivery lead time, and the uncertainty degrees for both of them. We also illustrate the importance of the bonus and penalty. When the on-site task duration and the material delivery lead time's uncertainty degrees increase, the manufacturer can still increase his profit no less than before by changing the bonus and penalty. Furthermore, through the items about the times of payment in this time-based contract, the manufacturer can transfer a part of his risks, brought by delay completion, to his suppliers.
There are possible extensions. Firstly, the project topology can be parallel. Secondly, the project with multiple tasks can be discussed. Thirdly, we can use the exponential discount to calculate the capital cost, which may be more in line with reality.
Definition 5.
[23] Let ξ be an uncertain variable. The expected value of ξ is defined by
provided that at least one of the above two integrals is finite.
Definition 6.
[23] An uncertainty distribution is called zigzag if it has a zigzag uncertainty distribution 
Proof of The Main Body
Proof of LEMMA 1. In the centralized project supply chain, the manufacturer's maximal profit is calculated as the difference between the discounted cost and payment.
Discuss the value of E[max(V 1 , t 2 )] in three cases:
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Take partial derivative of E[max(V 1 , t 2 )] with respect to t 2 and make the result be equal to zero under these three cases. The results are consistent.
Proof of PROPOSITION 1. According to the delayed-payment contract, assume that the supplier is aware of the delayed payment w 2 in the decentralized project supply chain. The model is expressed as J S (t 2 , w 2 ) = max
The manufacturer can induce the supplier's best response, t 2 (w 2 ), and he will optimize his problem witht 2 (w 2 ) at a rate α as follows:
Take partial derivative of J S with respect to t 2 and make the result be equal to zero.
This formula can be simplified as follows:
Take partial derivative of J M with respect to w 2 and make the result be equal to zero.
(15) Then it can be induced that
Assume thatt 2 (w 2 ) = t * 2 and consider Eq.(10),
Then,
However, according to Eq.(12),
The results of the former two formulas are contradictory, which means the assumption thatt 2 (w 2 ) = t * 2 is wrong. Therefore, the fixed-payment contract cannot achieve channel coordination.
Proof of THEOREM 1.
According to the time-based contract, when the manufacturer make a targeted delivery schedule T 2 in the decentralized project supply chain, the model of supplier 2 is as follows.
NCF 2 (t 2 , T 2 , α) is the net cash flow between the manufacturer and supplier 2. The manufacturer can induce his maximal profit considering the best solution of supplier 2. We now prove that the time-based contract can achieve channel coordination. Derive the first-order partial derivative of J S with respect to t 2 ; that is, 2 = 0.
The two conditions in THEOREM 1 are satisfied and the channel coordination has been achieved.
Proof of COROLLARY 1 and COROLLARY 3.
Assume that the two uncertain variables follow uncertain distributions.
The optimal model of the whole supply chain is as follows. For describing the influences of these six factors (m 1 , n 1 , o 1 , i 2 , j 2 , k 2 ) on J * SC , J * S and J * M , we need to derive the first-order conditions of J * SC , J * S and J * M with respect to a, b, c respectively. Note that, the zigzag distribution in uncertainty theory is a piecewise function. Thus we need to discuss it under different conditions. First, consider J * SC .
